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“Freudful Mistakes”: On Forgetting and On Forgetting Psychoanalysis 
Benjamin Noys 
 
Forget Psychoanalysis! 
 
If you forget psychoanalysis then “You never made a more freudful mistake, excuse yourself!” 
(Joyce 1992, p. 411) To forget psychoanalysis is, I will argue, amongst other things, to forget 
that language matters. Psychoanalysis, the “talking cure” (Freud and Breuer 1974, p. 83), a 
phrase coined by Anna O. in English, begins with a recognition of the power of language in 
relation to matter. Language, such as the signifier “arm” in the case of Anna O., determines the 
symptom, the paralysis of matter (Adams 1986). These are “magic words” (Abraham and Torok 
1986), which echo in the body and in matter. Language matters not only because language 
determines the unconscious symptom, but also because language engages with matter and 
because language itself is strangely material. We should not forget that. Today, however, we 
are called to abandon the “prison-house of language” for the “great outdoors” (Meillassoux 
2008, p. 7)—to escape the limits of human subjectivity and its “correlation” with reality, a 
correlation often achieved through language, for the materiality that lies beyond. In the ironic 
suggestion by the writer Iain Sinclair, considering his own constant writing on “territories,” 
“terrain does not require the neurosis of language” (2016, p. 38).1 The various speculative and 
new materialisms proclaim unironically, in different forms, that language does not matter or, 
more tentatively, that language matters less than matter. We are called to forget that language 
matters. What, though, if we try to remember language matters? What happens if we return to 
the matter of language through forgetting? These are the stakes of my intervention. 
 
Of course, James Joyce, who coined the phrase “freudful mistake” in Finnegans Wake, wanted 
nothing more than to forget psychoanalysis. Joyce was angered by C. G. Jung’s essay on Ulysses, 
hostile about Jung’s treatment of his daughter Lucia, and generally dismissive of the “new 
Viennese school” as inferior to the insights of Thomas Aquinas (Joyce 1994, p. 264). In 
Finnegans Wake, Joyce writes of the “grisly old Sykos who have done our unsmiling bit on 
’alices, when they were yung and easily freudened in the penumbra of the procuring room” 
(Joyce 1992, p. 115). The psychos, Freud and Jung, do grisly work on young girls in their 
consulting rooms, pimping them out to their “unsmiling” theories. Of course, however, Lacan 
wrote that Joyce “is the simplest consequence of a refusal—such a mental refusal!—of a 
psycho-analysis, which, as a result, his work illustrates” (Lacan 1977, p. ix). The revenge of 
psychoanalysis upon Joyce is that while Joyce may be the one who most forgot, or tried to 
forget, psychoanalysis, his work is, for Lacan, the greatest illustration of psychoanalysis as an 
encounter with language and with jouissance (Lacan 2016). After all, both Joyce and Freud 
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knew something of enjoyment, of jouissance, as their names testify (Lacan 2016, p. 146). They 
also both knew something about language. 
 
Joyce, we might say, forgets psychoanalysis to remember the matter of language, which is 
writing. According to Derrida, what Joyce finds in writing is an 
 
endeavour [that] would try to make the structural unity of all empirical culture appear in the 
generalised equivocation of a writing that, no longer translating one language into another on the 
basis of their common cores of sense, circulates through all languages at once, accumulates their 
energies, actualises their most secret consonances, discloses their furthermost common horizons, 
cultivates their associative syntheses instead of avoiding them, and rediscovers the poetic value of 
passivity. (Derrida 1989, p. 102) 
 
Joyce’s passivity before language tries to make language appear as such, but also, as Lacan 
suggested, makes language appear as lalangue, the intersection of jouissance and language 
(Lacan 2016, p. 146). Jacques-Alain Miller notes that “there is a jouissance, which drives directly 
from the relation to language” (Miller 2005, p. 12), which Joyce achieves. Joyce’s writing is a 
writing that while trying to forget psychoanalysis illustrates the saturation of language by 
jouissance, the moment of the “lettering” and “littering” of language (Joyce 1992, p. 93; Lacan 
2016, p. 145). Language appears in and through equivocation and homophony (Milner 2017). 
The “freudful mistake” is the “frightful mistake” (through English as lalangue) and a “joyful 
mistake” (through German as lalangue). The frightful mistake is to forget the “freudful mistake” 
and so to forget the joyful mistake, to forget that language matters. This is why the path back 
to psychoanalysis and language lies in the Freudian slip, as the moment that allows us to 
register that language matters in its frightful and joyful aspects. 
 
The Primal Scene of Forgetting 
 
Freud is driving in the company of a stranger from Ragusa in Dalmatia to a place in 
Herzegovina: “I asked my companion whether he had ever been to Orvieto and looked at the 
famous frescoes painted there, painted by . . .” (Freud 1975, p. 39). An ellipsis appears, the 
three dots (. . .) that indicate an omission or falling short. In this case, the omission of the name 
of the painter, a moment of forgetting, a falling short at the moment of expression. This 
elliptical moment might well be understood as the rhetorical figure of “aposiopesis,” the 
indication of a “falling silent.” As a rhetorical figure, this usually indicates being overcome by 
passion, being speechless with rage or feeling. In fact, we could say, Freud’s analysis will supply 
that missing passion to what seems a trivial act of forgetting. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 On neurosis as the “mediation” of language, the psyche and the material, see Noys 2017a and 2018. 
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Freud has forgotten the name of a painter, Signorelli, who painted the frescoes the “Four Last 
Things” in Orvieto Cathedral. It is an apocalyptic moment. Freud, however, remembers two 
other names of painters—Botticelli and Boltraffio (ibid., p. 38). Freud seeks explanation in the 
previous topic of conversation, which concerned the (supposed) custom of “Turks” living in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to confide in doctors and resign themselves to their fate when fatally 
ill. They address the doctor as “Herr [Sir]” (ibid., p. 39). A second, repressed thought of Freud’s 
is the emphasis these “Turks” place on sexual enjoyment as the highest value of life—so much 
so that death is preferable to that loss. Here we can see in the figure of these “Turks” fantasies 
of racialized enjoyment and the speculation on a subject who possesses “full” enjoyment and, 
in this case, who will sacrifice their life for the sake of that enjoyment (Žižek 1990). In particular, 
this is the continuation of the fantasy of the “Orient” that projects on to the Other as site of 
enjoyment (Grosrichard 1998). Freud was also concerned with the news that reached him at 
Trafoi of a patient’s suicide due to an incurable sexual disorder (Freud 1975, p. 40). Forgetting 
was not random, but motivated, and motivated by the desire to repress thoughts of “death and 
sexuality” (ibid., p. 40). 
 
This act of repression is evident in the process by which Signorelli is forgotten. The name is split 
in two, in which the first part, “Signor,” which recalls “Herr” and so death and sexuality, is 
displaced into Herzegovina and Bosnia (ibid., p. 41). The second part, “elli” is then the root for 
the movement from Bosnia into “Botticelli,” while “Boltraffio” absorbs “Trafoi” and the “Bo.” 
The result is a rebus, a picture puzzle,2 and this is the chance for one of Freud’s famous 
diagrams,3 which traces the splitting of the signifier into component “letters,” little bits of 
nonsense, that are treated homophonically to generate new signifiers (ibid., p. 41). This 
moment of forgetting is the eruption of lalangue into language, in which the failure of 
repression reveals not only the instance of Freud’s forgetting and repression, but also the 
“primal repression” which denies the entry of the “psychical (ideational) representative” of the 
drive into consciousness and language (Freud 1984a, p .147). It is the absence, the “hole” made 
in language (Lacan 2016, p. 21), which reveals the insistence of the drive as what matters. The 
drive is that uncanny concept “lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical” 
(Freud 1977, p. 83; Dolar 2017). In this moment matter, in the form of the insistence of the 
drive, of the bodily circuit (Lacan 1977, p. 178), penetrates language, to cross Freud’s diagram 
of forgetting with Lacan’s diagram of the circuit of the drive (ibid.). 
 
Already, this remembering of forgetting in psychoanalysis I am undertaking is taking place 
under the tutelage of Lacan, who has done most to remind psychoanalysis, which can also 
                                                 
2 Freud famously describes the dream as a “rebus” (Freud 1976, p. 382). 
3 On Freud’s diagrams, see Gamwell and Solms 2006. 
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forget, that language matters. In fact, Lacan draws inspiration from Freud’s account of 
forgetting as a revelation that the unconscious operates through language, through the 
signifier, and also by “effacement” (ibid., p. 27). It is this operation through language that 
means that Freud’s notion of the unconscious is, according to Lacan, not the Romantic 
unconscious of “the divinities of the night” (ibid., p. 24).4 The unconscious is not the site of 
“primordial will” but of the “play of the signifier” (ibid.). This is not a happy play, because in the 
phenomena of the unconscious there is always an impediment (ibid., p. 25). “In a spoken or 
written sentence something stumbles” (ibid.). In this moment, we see “absence emerge” and 
“silence emerge as silence” (ibid., p. 26). For Lacan, the incident of the forgetting of Signorelli is 
one that demonstrates this mode of effacement, of silence emerging and of the censorship by 
which the unconscious emerges: 
 
The term Signor, Herr, passes underneath—the absolute master, I once said, which is in fact 
death, has disappeared there. Furthermore, do we not see, behind this, the emergence of that 
which forced Freud to find in the myths of the death of the father the regulation of his desire? 
After all, it is to be found in Nietzsche, who declares, in his own myth, that God is dead. And it is 
perhaps against the background of the same reasons. For the myth of the God is dead—which, 
personally, I feel much less sure about, as a myth of course, than most contemporary 
intellectuals, which is in no sense a declaration of theism, nor of faith in the resurrection—
perhaps this myth is simply a shelter against the threat of castration. / If you know how to read 
them, you will see this threat in the apocalyptic frescoes of Orvieto cathedral. (Lacan 1977, p. 27; 
see also Lacan 2002, p. 316) 
 
A certain defence emerges even in Freud, about the “absolute master” death, about the myths 
of the dead father, which like Nietzsche’s death of God, is, Lacan suggests, a shelter against the 
threat of castration. In this way, we can suggest, Freud is also at risk of forgetting the relation 
to language as the relation to castration. Even more radically, as Miller suggests, castration, or 
the fantasies around it, might conceal “the true traumatic kernel […] the relation to language” 
(Miller 2005, p. 15). 
 
The risk of making the trauma the trauma of the relation to language is that the relation of 
language to the drive might be occluded. What we can take from Lacan is the rewriting of 
forgetting, of the lapsus, of the “freudful mistake” towards the “frightful mistake” and the 
“joyful mistake”—towards the “original fault” (Lacan 2016, p. 5). For Lacan, writing in Seminar 
XXIII: 
 
                                                 
4 It is for this reason that the prophets of the vitalist Romantic unconscious constantly reject the “mechanical” (we 
would say logical) unconscious of Freud, from Jung to Ludwig Klages (Lebovic 2013, p. 53; Noys 2015, p. 172). 
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The fault expresses the life of language, life being utterly different for language from what is 
simply called life. What signifies death for the somatic support has just as much place as life in the 
drives that fall within the remit of what I’ve just called vie de langage. (Lacan 2016, p. 128) 
 
The life of language is something that coincides with death, or coincides with the uncanny 
correspondence between the life drive and the death drive. This is what is forgotten in the 
forgetting of psychoanalysis, of forgetting, and of language—the “life of language” in which the 
drive intersects with and infuses language. 
 
Two Ways of Forgetting Psychoanalysis 
 
What does it mean to forget this moment of forgetting? What if we were to forget the drive, to 
forget psychoanalysis? This often takes the form of an imperative “forget about it”; an active 
desire to forget the psychoanalytic interpretation of forgetting. Forgetting remains, but without 
the causal form psychoanalysis inscribes, without “death and sexuality,” without the drive. This 
is the moment of resistance to psychoanalysis, which, as Jacques Derrida proposes, can take a 
double form: the usual sense resistance to psychoanalysis, as an opposition to psychoanalysis, 
and the second sense of a resistance of psychoanalysis, an internal resistance in which 
psychoanalysis confronts its own limit (Derrida 1998, pp. vii-viii). I want to take two examples 
that instantiate these forms of resistance and forgetting. The first is that of Sebastiano 
Timpanor’s The Freudian Slip (1974), which targets Freudian slips and this instance of Freud’s 
forgetting. Timpanaro rejects psychoanalysis as an unnecessary imposition of the unconscious 
onto language by suggesting that language itself can account for this forgetting and any 
“freudful mistakes.” If this is resistance to psychoanalysis, Catherine Malabou’s The New 
Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage (2007) is an example of the resistance of 
psychoanalysis, in which psychoanalysis is pushed towards its internal limit. Malabou argues 
that not only can psychoanalysis not account for the traumatic results of brain injury or illness, 
but also that these forms of damage pose a problem to the psychoanalytic search for meaning 
in relation to trauma. 
 
Sebastiano Timpanaro is an almost classical instance of the resistance to psychoanalysis. In The 
Freudian Slip, as his friend Perry Anderson summarizes: 
 
Timpanaro showed how often errors of memory or slips of the tongue that Freud had attributed 
to repressed sexual materials were to be explained more persuasively by a standard set of 
deviations from the lexical norm, “corruptions” of which philologists had developed their own 
fine-grained classification. (Anderson 2001) 
 
 6 
It is the materiality of language, rather than any force of “death and sexuality,” which is to 
account for “freudful mistakes.” Even more classically, Timpanaro’s objections to 
psychoanalysis are also rooted in a personal animus due to its failure to cure him of his neurotic 
symptoms—the intense anxiety caused by public speaking and agoraphobia (Anderson 2001). 
What is noteworthy, although at the risk of “wild psychoanalysis,” is that these symptoms are 
symptoms of speaking and of appearing in public. They are symptoms that language matters in 
the relation of desire to expression. 
 
In Timpanaro’s account of Freud’s forgetting of Signorelli and its replacement by Botticelli, the 
explanation is that it is merely “a confusion between words of an equal number of syllables 
which are also connected by a marked phonic similarity, or even better, by assonance or 
rhyme” (Timpanaro 1976, p. 64). The explanation of the more unlikely substitution of Boltraffio 
is, according to Timpanaro, a misguided act of correction (ibid., p. 71). As Freud is now thinking 
of Botticelli, the path of correction lies along Renaissance artists beginning with “Bo-”. For 
Timpanaro, language matters but in the very matter of its blind materiality, in the very literal 
substance of its own operations that create errors for its users.5 
 
This scepticism towards psychoanalysis also extends to what Timpanaro understands of Lacan’s 
emphasis on the “primacy” of the signifier (ibid., p. 222). While Timpanaro concedes, in a 
postscript, this is “not without interest” (ibid.), in a footnote in the body of the text he is much 
more typically condemnatory: 
 
I must confess that I am incurably committed to the view that in Lacan’s writing charlatanry and 
exhibitionism largely prevail over any ideas that are of a comprehensible, even if debatable, 
nature: behind the smoke-screen, it seems to me, there is nothing of substance (Timpanaro 1976, 
p. 58 n. 5) 
 
The unkind Freudian or Lacanian critic might note the excess of this denunciation, including the 
accusation of “exhibitionism,” in relation to Timpanaro’s own phobias, but what is also 
interesting is the suggestion of a lack of “substance.” We might read this in terms of the 
replacement of the materialism of language with a materialism of the signifier. Again, the 
resistance to psychoanalysis turns on materiality—on the rejection of psychic reality, let alone 
the Lacanian Real, Catherine Malabou has suggested the necessity of taking neuroscience 
seriously as a thinking of the capacities of the brain. Using her concept of plasticity, also a term 
in neuroscience, Malabou argues that the brain offers capacities for change that are not simply 
consonant with neoliberal capitalist flexibility (Malabou 2008, pp. 78–82). Also, as plasticity can 
                                                 
5 There is some strange similarity between this contention and the late work of Paul de Man, who argues that it is 
“the prosaic materiality of the letter” which disrupts ideology and aesthetics (de Man 1996, p. 90). 
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refer to traumatic damage (as in plastic explosives), Malabou argues the brain can undergo far 
more radical traumas than are usually considered in psychoanalysis. In line with Spinoza’s 
famous remark about the body, “they do not know what a body can do” (Spinoza 1976, p. 72), 
we can say, “they do not know what a brain can do.” 
 
Malabou’s analysis in The New Wounded makes a transition, as her subtitle has it, “from 
neurosis to brain damage.” Malabou argues that psychoanalysis relies on a sexual aetiology of 
neurosis that correlates an external traumatic event with an inner sexual conflict (Malabou 
2012, p. 2). This involves Freud distinguishing violent events that affect the brain, such as 
lesions or brain damage, from the field of psychic life. What psychoanalysis cannot think, 
according to Malabou, is “the wound without hermeneutic future” (ibid., p. 8), a charge she 
also repeats to Lacan and Žižek (Malabou 2015). Contrary to the image of a subject already 
subject to sexual trauma, Malabou posits the “new wounded” as forms of subjectivity in which 
trauma intrudes from outside, is senseless, and rearranges the coordinates of personality.6 In 
this way, she eliminates the psychoanalytic account of forgetting, which depends on sexual 
meaning and the drive, from consideration in psychic life. While we might recognize the truth 
of this claim, but see it as restricted to these severe forms of brain damage, Malabou argues 
 
I thus authorize myself also to extend the category of “new wounded” to cover every patient in a 
state of shock who, without having suffered brain lesions, has seen his or her neuronal 
organization and psychic equilibrium permanently changed by trauma. (Malabou 2012, p. 10; 
italics in original) 
 
While traversing psychoanalysis to the limit of the hermeneutic, both in Freud and Lacan, 
Malabou ends up restricting psychoanalysis to a very limited field as the “new wounded” 
expands as a category to become the signature disorder of the present moment. 
 
To repeat Derrida terms, Malabou’s resistance of psychoanalysis comes to coincide with 
Timpanaro’s resistance to psychoanalysis. Malabou’s argument is for a materiality of the brain 
that also constitutes an affective plasticity and so replaces language (and the problem of 
forgetting) as the key to our “psychic” life. What I want to note is a strange symmetry here. On 
the one hand, for Timpanaro, language matters more as the matter of language. Forgetting 
(and slips) are merely the stuff of language, merely errors resulting from the form of language. 
Also, interestingly, Timpanaro also hopes for a neurophysiological explanation that will 
transcend the claims to science made by Freudian psychoanalysis (Timpanaro 1976, p. 95). On 
the other hand, for Malabou, language matters less to get at the matter of the brain. Forgetting 
                                                 
6 Malabou appears to be drawing upon Derrida’s argument that psychoanalysis cannot deal with “radical 
destruction” that goes beyond a logic of repression and retention (Derrida 1998, p. 44). 
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is a matter of the worst, of radical trauma from the outside that is not amenable to language 
and meaning. In both cases, materiality is posed against the matter of language, if we take that 
matter, as I have suggested, to be this strange signifying absence. Language is “filled in,” or 
completed, by a materiality that absorbs this absence. 
 
Remember Psychoanalysis! 
 
I am suggesting that Timpanaro and Malabou represent two ways to forget psychoanalysis and 
so to forget language matters by forgetting the strange immaterial materiality of language. To 
complete this suggestion, I want to conclude by turning to Freud’s late essay on “Negation” 
(1925). Lacan remarks on this text that 
 
It is not one of those two dimensional texts, which are infinitely flat, as mathematicians say, which 
have only a fiduciary value in a constituted discourse, but rather a text which carries speech 
insofar as speech constitutes a new emergence of truth. (Lacan 2002, p. 318) 
 
This essay is well-known for its opening concerning the moment of resistance. Freud recounts 
how patients present material in the mode of a negation: “You ask who this person in the 
dream can be. It’s not my mother.” The psychoanalyst’s rejoinder is “So it is his mother” (Freud 
1984b, p. 437; italics in original).7 Timpanaro singles out this moment as the sign of a Freudian 
refusal to consider counterexamples: “the patient is always, or nearly always, wrong when he 
makes a denial, because every negation on his part is in reality a manifestation of resistance 
and thus an involuntary confession” (Timpanaro 1976, p. 56). In this way, according to 
Timpanaro, while Freud recognizes a psychological mechanism he generalizes it to such an 
extent that there is no space for denial and refutation within psychoanalysis.8 
 
This initial point in Freud’s paper opens out onto a discussion of negation that has a wider 
“metapsychological” significance as a mechanism of defence crucial to the ego (Lacan 2002, p. 
311). Because what is negated appears, negation is a lifting of repression if not an acceptance 
of what has been repressed. Lacan notes, through negation “doubtless the ego makes a great 
many things known to us” (Lacan 1988, p. 59). In the experience of negation, the affective and 
the intellectual are separated, but, we would add, the material and the linguistic are 
intertwined. This is evident in the fact that the act of negation is an intellectual function linked 
to the “primitive” function of the oral drive. The intellectual judgement of negation 
corresponds to the judgement of whether I would like to eat this or whether I would like to spit 
it out (Freud 1984b, p. 439). The act of negation is the act of spitting something out, but in that 
                                                 
7 On the “logic” of this negation of the mother, see Zupančič 2012. 
8 Freud would later dispute this claim to infallibility in his “Constructions in Analysis” (1937). 
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act what is negated appears, it has a presence in the mouth, on the tongue, before being 
negated, before becoming nothing. If, in forgetting, something is present in the mode of 
absence, we can “taste” the absent word on the tip of our tongue, in negation something 
absent is made present to be ejected from the mouth—to be spat out. This can obviously 
include words, as we can spit those out too. 
 
This intellectual function is also a matter of the drives. Judging refers not only to oral desire, but 
also, in the polarity of judgement, to the drive: “Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—
belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction” 
(ibid., p. 441). Negation is rooted in these drives, but is also a moment of “freedom,” through 
the creation of a “symbol of negation” (ibid.). Certainly, as we have seen with Lacan’s emphasis 
on the “life of language,” the mythological opposition of Eros and Thanatos can be collapsed in 
the thinking of the drive as both binding and unbinding (Laplanche 1976). This is a point 
reiterated by Žižek, for whom the “death drive” is the inconsistent repetition that haunts and 
inhabits the libido (Žižek 2010, p. 305). The act of negation is the revelation of that repetition, 
but also a revelation that bears on the materiality of language as the moment in which 
language concedes the intrusion of the drive. 
 
Language emerges as the moment of negation that, as Paolo Virno insists in a different manner, 
disrupts agreement and consonance for the possibility of destruction and even evil (Virno 
2008). It also, I am suggesting, marks the moment of negativity as a “materiality” that comes to 
be in the moment of ejection. Language matters in this strange space of “materialization” and 
dematerialization of “something” and “nothing.” Forgetting points us towards this strange 
presence of absence, which is denied in those materialisms that try to close the mouth to 
language. They negate language, which is to say they make it present but only to say “No, 
language doesn’t matter.” Negation points to this persistence of language in the moment of 
denial. It indicates the way in which resistance and denial of language and of psychoanalysis 
carries the trace of that denial, of that liminal space in which “language matters.” As we live in 
the time of materialisms of many types (although few that are historical or dialectical), we live 
in the time in which language does not matter. Language has to disappear, to be forgotten, to 
be spat out. In the face of the circulating abstractions that make up our world, the appeal to 
materialism is to something that denies these abstractions. Yet, the forgetting and denial “that 
language matters” leaves us only with a pseudo-concrete and with little sense of what matters. 
The matter of abstraction is rendered absent by the abstraction of matter. 
 
Therefore, the Freudian and Lacanian account might seem relentlessly focused on the human 
subject. This, for the new materialisms, is the original fault or sin that forgets the nonhuman. 
Jane Bennett argues that: 
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To attempt, as I do, to present human and nonhuman actants on a less vertical plane than is 
common is to bracket the question of the human and to elide the rich and diverse literature on 
subjectivity and its genesis, its condition of possibility, and its boundaries. (Bennett 2010, p. ix) 
 
Access to “vital matter” is bought at what Bennett regards as the necessary cost of the elision 
of psychoanalysis. Instead, my suggestion is that the only access to matter is through this 
experience of subjectivity and at the boundary in which “matter” is not stable between the 
“inside” and “outside” of the subject. This experience is signalled by forgetting and negation in 
the mode in which language fails or in which language succeeds in rendering matter as 
something “outside.” The “great outdoors” is as much a “great indoors,” or the mediation or 
“metabolic interaction” (Marx 1990, p. 290), which forms the experience of matter. 
 
William Burroughs once remarked, the “word may once have been a healthy neural cell. It is 
now a parasitic organism that invades and damages the central nervous system” (Burroughs 
1999, p. 208). The conception of language as a virus, as an alien parasite or intrusion, speaks to 
the way in which language matters. On the one hand, as we have seen, language is a virus to be 
expelled to get to what matters—the materiality of language or the materiality of the brain (or 
a whole number of other materialities of the “great outdoors”). On the other hand, language is 
a virus that matters and that remains in the mouth. We forget language, only to remember that 
language matters, only to really remember this strange “mattering” of language: “It’s on the tip 
of my tongue.” “Just spit it out!” In this moment of the mouthfeel of language something 
matters. The desire to be free of the “virus” of language and to access matter or the nonhuman 
directly is a fantasy conditioned by the experience of the drive and of language. In the process 
of forgetting psychoanalysis, this mediation is forgotten or elided to ensure a process in which 
nothing gets stuck in the mouth or throat.9 Psychoanalysis, on the contrary, finds matter in that 
“nothing” stuck in the mouth, in the matter of language that engages with this “nothing” in the 
redoubled negation. If psychoanalysis matters today, and nothing could be less certain, it is due 
to this “nothing” that matters. 
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